Abstract. We present a polynomial time attack of a rank metric code based encryption scheme due to Loidreau for some parameters.
Introduction
To instantiate McEliece encryption scheme, one needs a family of codes with random looking generator matrices and an efficient decoding algorithm. If the original proposal due to McEliece himself [12] relies on classical Goppa codes endowed with the Hamming metric, one can actually consider codes endowed with any other metric. The use of F q m -linear rank metric codes, first suggested by Gabidulin et. al. [7] is of particular interest, since the F q m -linearity permits a very "compact" representation of the code and hence permits to design a public key encryption scheme with rather short keys compared to the original McEliece proposal.
Compared to the Hamming metric world, only few families of codes with efficient decoding algorithms are known in rank metric. Basically, the McEliece scheme has been instantiated with two general families of rank metric codes, namely Gabidulin codes [5, 6] and LRPC codes [8] .
In [11] , Loidreau proposed the use of codes which can somehow be regarded as an intermediary version between Gabidulin codes and LRPC codes. These codes are obtained by right multiplying a Gabidulin code with an invertible matrix whose entries are in F q m and span an F qsubspace of small dimension λ. This approach can be regarded as a "rank metric" counterpart of BBCRS scheme [1] in Hamming metric.
In the present article, we explain why the case λ = 2 and dim C pub n/2 is weak and describe a key recovery attack in this situation.
Note. The material of the present article has been communicated to Pierre Loidreau in April 2016. The article [11] is subsequent to this discussion and proposes parameters which avoid the attack described in the present article.
Prerequisites

Rank metric codes
In this article m, n denote positive integers and q a prime power. A code of dimension k is an F q m -subspace of F n q m whose dimension as an F q m -vector space is k. Given a vector x ∈ F n q m , the rank weight or rank of x, denoted as |x| R is the dimension of the F q -vector sub-space of F q m spanned by the entries of x. The support of a vector x ∈ F n q m , denoted supp(x) is the F q -vector space spanned by the entries of x. Hence the rank of x is nothing but the dimension of its support. The rank distance or distance of two vectors x, y ∈ F n q m is defined as
Given a code C ⊆ F n q m , the minimum distance of C is defined as
Remark 1. Note that rank metric codes can be defined in a more general setting as subspace of a space of matrices or a space of morphisms between two vector spaces. A code C ⊆ F n q m can be regarded as a space of matrices by choosing an F q -basis of F q m and associating to each vector c ∈ C the matrix whose i-th column is the decomposition of the entry c i in the basis. A major difference between general spaces of matrices and the codes we introduced is that our vector spaces have an F q m -linear structure. We chose to limit our presentation to codes of the form C ⊆ F n q m since only these codes are the object of the study in the present article.
q-polynomials and Gabidulin codes
A q-polynomial or a linear polynomial is an F q m -linear combination of monomials X, X q , X q 2 , . . . , X q s , . . . Such a polynomial induces a function F q m → F q m which is F q -linear. The q-degree of a q-polynomial P , denoted by deg q (P ) is the integer s such that the degree of P is q s . In short:
The following very classical result is crucial in what follows.
be a q-polynomial. Then, the set of roots of P in F q m is an F q -vector space of dimension less than or equal to deg q P .
The space of q-polynomials is denoted by L and, given a positive integer s, the space of q-polynomials of degree less than s is denoted by
Given positive integers k, n with k n m and an n-tuple a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of F q -linearly independent elements of F q m , the Gabidulin code G k (a) is defined as
This code has a generator matrix of the form:
Such codes are known to have minimum distance n − k + 1 and to benefit from a decoding algorithm correcting up to half the minimum distance (see [9] ). The n-tuple a is referred to as the support of the code. Note that the support is not unique as shown by the following lemma which will be useful for our attack.
Proof. Let P ∈ F q m [X] be a q-polynomial of q-degree < k and Q ∈ F q m [X] be the q-polynomial of the same degree defined by Q(X) = P (α −1 X). Then the codeword (P (a 1 ), . . . , P (a n )) ∈ G k (a) is equal to the codeword (Q(αa 1 ), . . . , Q(αa n )) ∈ G k (αa). This proves that G k (g) ⊆ G k (αg) and the converse inclusion is proved in a similar fashion.
⊓ ⊔
The component-wise Frobenius map
In what follows, we will frequently apply the component-wise Frobenius map or its iterates to vectors or codes. Hence, we introduce the following notation. Given a vector v ∈ F n q m and a nonnegative integer s, we denote by v [s] the vector:
Similarly, given a code C ⊆ F n q m and a positive integer s, the code
Overbeck's distinguisher
In [13] , Overbeck proposes a general framework to break cryptosystems based on Gabidulin codes. The core of his attack is that a simple operation permits to distinguish Gabidulin codes from random ones. Indeed, given a random code C ⊆ F n q m of dimension k < n/2, the expected dimension of the code C + C [1] equals 2k and, equivalently C ∩ C [1] is likely to be equal to 0. More generally, we have the following statement.
Proposition 2.
If C rand is a code of length n and dimension k chosen uniformly at random, then for a nonnegative integer a and for a positive integer s < k, we have
Proof. See Appendix A.
⊓ ⊔
On the other hand, for a Gabidulin code, the behaviour with respect to such operations is completely different as explained in the following statement.
Proposition 3. Let a ∈ F n q m be a word of rank n, k n and s be an integer. Then,
Example 1. As an illustration of the difference of behaviour of Gabidulin codes compared to random codes, given a Gabidulin code G of length n and dimension k < n/2, then dim G + G [1] = k + 1, while for a random code C rand of the same length and dimension, P dim C rand +C rand [1] = 2k tends to 1 when m tends to infinity.
Loidreau's scheme
In order to mask the structure of Gabidulin codes and to resist to Overbeck's attack, Loidreau suggested in [11] the following construction. Denote by G a random generator matrix of a Gabidulin code G k (a). Fix an integer λ m and an F q -vector subspace V of F q m of dimension λ. Let P ∈ GL(n, F q m ) whose entries are all in V. Then, let
We have the following encryption scheme.
Public key: The pair (G pub , t) where
The pair (a, P ). Encryption: Given a plaintext m ∈ F k q m , choose a uniformly random vector e ∈ F n q m of rank weight t. The ciphertext is
Decryption: Compute, cP = mG + eP .
Since the entries of P are all in V then, the entries of eP are in the product space supp(e) · V def = uv | u ∈ supp(e), v ∈ V Fq . The dimension of this space is bounded from above by tλ n−k 2 . Therefore, using a classical decoding algorithm for Gabidulin codes, one can recover m.
3 A distinguisher when λ = 2
Context
The goal of this section is to establish a distinguisher for Loidreau's cryptosystem instantiated with λ = 2 and a public code C pub of dimension k n 2 . Similarly to Overbeck's attack, this distinguisher reposes on Propositions 2 and 3.
Similarly to the attacks of BBCRS system [3, 4] , it is more convenient to work on the dual of the public code because of the following lemmas. By dual, we mean the orthogonal code with respect to the canonical inner product
Lemma 3 ([4, Lemma 1]). Any full-rank generator matrix H pub of C ⊥ pub can be decomposed as
where H sec is a parity-check of the Gabidulin code G k (a).
The convenient aspect of the previous lemma is that the matrix P has its entries in a small vector space, while its inverse has not.
The case λ = 2
We suppose in this section that the vector space V ⊆ F n q m in which the matrix P has all its entries has dimension 2:
Note that, w.l.o.g, one can suppose that 1 ∈ V. Indeed, if V is spanned over F q by α, β ∈ F q m \{0}, then one can replace H sec by H ′ sec = αH sec which spans the same code and P ′ = α −1 P has entries in V ′ = Span 1, α −1 β and H pub = H ′ sec P ′T . Thus, from now on, we suppose that V = Span{1, γ} for some γ ∈ F q m \ F q . Consequently, P T can be decomposed as
where P 0 , P 1 are square matrices with entries in F q . For convenience, we suppose from now on that P 0 and P 1 are both invertible. Note that this actually holds with a high probability. If one of these matrices was not invertible, then the attack could probably be performed after minor adjustments.
We have seen that C ⊥ sec = G n−k (a) for some a ∈ F n q m with |a| R = n. We define g def = aP 0 and h def = aP 1 .
Lemma 4. The code C ⊥ pub is spanned by
Proof. For any c ∈ C ⊥ pub . There exists P ∈ L <n−k such that
which yields the result.
⊓ ⊔
We can now state a crucial result.
Theorem 1. The dual of the public code satisfies:
Proof. Thanks to Lemma 4, we prove that C + C [1] is spanned by
Equivalently, C + C [1] is spanned by:
g + γh and g [1] , h [1] , . . . ,
Finally, a similar reasoning permits to show that
is spanned by g + γh and g [1] ,
and hence has dimension at most 2(n − k) + 2. ⊓ ⊔ As a conclusion, thanks to Proposition 2, we deduce that C ⊥ pub is distinguishable in polynomial time from a random code as soon as 2k−2 > n.
The attack
In this section, we derive an attack from the distinguisher defined in Section 3. In what follows, we suppose that λ = 2 and the public code has rate larger than 1/2 so that the distinguisher introduced in Section 3 works on it. Recall that C ⊥ pub = G n−k (a)P for some a ∈ F n q m whose entries are F q -independent and P is of the form P 0 + γP 1 for P 0 , P 1 ∈ M n (F q ) and γ ∈ F q m \ F q . Finally recall that
In addition, we make the following assumptions:
(1) P 0 , P 1 ∈ GL(n, F q );
(2) m > 2 and γ is not contained in any subfield of
Assumption (1) has already been discussed in § 3.2. Assumption (2) is reasonable in order to prevent against possible attacks based on an exhaustive search of γ. Finally, Assumption (3) is what typically happens according to our experiments using Magma [2] . The aim of the attack is to recover the triple (γ, g, h), or more precisely, to recover a triple (γ ′ , g ′ , h ′ ) such that
Actually, the triple (γ, g, h) is far from being unique and any other triple satisfying (1) permits to decrypt messages (see further § 4.3). Let us describe an action of PGL(2, F q ) on such triples.
Proposition 4. Let a, b, c, d ∈ F q such that ad − bc = 0 and δ ∈ F q m such that γ = aδ+b cδ+d . Then, the triple (δ, dg + bh, cg + ah) satisfies (1). Proof. It suffices to observe that for any i 0,
.
⊓ ⊔
4.1
Step 1: using the distinguisher to compute some subcodes
As shown in the proof of Theorem 1,
is spanned by:
where r def = n − k − 1. Then, by iterating intersections
we obtain the code spanned by
Notice that Assumption (3) permits to prove that this intersection has exactly dimension 2. Applying the inverse of the r-th Frobenius, we get the code spanned by g + γh and g [1] + γ q 1−r h [1] .
Note that r = n − k − 1 < n m. Hence γ q 1−r = γ q because of Assumption (2). Next, one can compute
and g + γh, g [1] + γ q 1−r h [1] + g + γh [1] = g + γh, g [1] + γ q 1−r h [1] , g [1] + γ q h [1] = g + γh, g [1] , h [1] .
Similarly, we compute the intersection with
Applying the inverse Frobenius to the last code, we get g + γ q m−2 h . Since, from (2), we also know g + γh , one can compute
Next, for any i ∈ {0, . . . , r} one can compute
By applying the i-th inverse Frobenius to the previous result, we obtain the space g + γ q −i h for any i ∈ {0, . . . , r}. In summary, we know the spaces
In addition, from Lemma 1, the vector g is determined up to some multiplicative constant. Therefore, one can choose an arbitrary element of g + γh and suppose that this element is g + γh.
Step 2. Finding γ
In summary, the vector g + γh and the spaces g + γ q i h for any i ∈ {−1, . . . , −r} are known. To compute γ, we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For i, j ∈ {1, . . . , r}, i = j, there exists a unique pair
Proof. It suffices to observe that g, h = g
The pairs of vectors (u ij , v ij ) can be easily computed. Thus, from now on, we suppose we know them. In addition, despite γ, g + γ q −i h and g + γ q −j h are unknown, a calculation permits to show that u ij , v ij have the following expressions.
Consider the vectors u 12 and u 13 . They are collinear since, from (5), they are both multiples of g + γ q −1 h. Therefore, one can compute the scalar α such that u 12 = α · u 13 . From (5) we deduce that γ satisfies the following relation.
Or equivalently, γ is a root of the polynomial
One can easily check that (X q − X) q+1 divides Q γ and we set
The element γ we look for is a root of P γ but actually, the forthcoming Proposition 5 provides the description of the other roots. We first need a technical Lemma.
Lemma 6. Let a, b, c, d ∈ F q , let i, j be two nonnegative integers and set
Proposition 5. The set of roots of P γ equals the orbit of γ under the action of PGL(2, F q ). Equivalently, any root of P γ is of the form aγ+b cγ+d for a, b, c, d ∈ F q such that ad − bc = 0.
Proof. First, notice that deg Q γ = q 3 + q 2 and hence
Second, for any a b c d ∈ PGL(2, F q ), Lemma 6 entails
Since γ ∈ F q m \ F q , then cγ + d = 0 and hence, P γ aγ+b cγ+d = 0. We proved that any element in the orbit of γ under PGL(2, F q ) is a root of P γ . To conclude, we need to prove that the orbit of γ under PGL(2, F q ) has cardinality deg P γ = q 3 −q which means that the stabilizer of γ with respect to this group action is trivial. Indeed, suppose that
, which has degree at most 2. This contradicts Assumption (2).
⊓ ⊔
Thanks to Propositions 4 and 5, we deduce that choosing an arbitrary root γ ′ of P γ provides a candidate for γ and there remains to compute g ′ , h ′ providing our triple. Since γ =
where
Considering (5) and using Lemma 6, we get
Consequently, we know γ ′ and the vectors g ′ + γ ′ h ′ = g + γh and u 12 . Thus, we can also compute
Knowing γ ′ , g ′ + γ ′ h ′ and g ′ + γ ′q −1 h ′ permits to recover (g ′ , h ′ ).
End of the attack
Given the pair g ′ , h ′ , compute the unique matrix Q ∈ GL(n,
and this representation of the dual provides all the elements necessary to decode, that is to decrypt any ciphertext.
Conclusion
We provided a distinguisher à la Overbeck for the public keys of Loidreau's scheme when λ = 2 and the public code has rate R pub 1 2 . From this distinguisher, we are able to derive a polynomial time key recovery attack. This attack can probably be extended to other values of λ when the public code rate satisfies R pub 1 − 1 λ . Therefore, such parameters should be avoided in Loidreau's scheme.
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where the last equality is obtained by applying the change of variables
The sequence a k is increasing and converges. Indeed,
and the series with general term − log(1 − 1/q j+1 ) converges. As a conclusion, the right-hand inequality is obtained by taking
A finer analysis would permit to prove that C−1−1 . In particular, since q 2, we have that C 4.
A.2 The proof
Let C rand be a subspace of F n q m chosen uniformly at random among its subspaces of dimension k. From C rand we build the map Ψ :
The image of this map is C rand + C rand
and hence the dimension of C rand +C rand [1] +· · ·+C rand [s] is related to the dimension of the kernel of Ψ . Therefore, our approach will consist in estimating E (| ker Ψ |).
We have
Lemma 8. Let A be a subspace of F n q m of dimension t k. Then
where C is the constant of Lemma 7.
Proof. We have
Using Lemma 7 we get the upper bound,
⊓ ⊔
For any 0 t s + 1, we introduce the set
Thanks to (7) and Lemma 8, we can write that
Lemma 9. Let 1 t k − 1. Then,
Proof. Let (x 0 , . . . , x s ) ∈ E t . Since the x i 's span a space of dimension t, there exists a unique (s + 1 − t) × (s + 1) full rank matrix M in reduced echelon form with entries in F q m such that
Let us count the number of possible (s + 1)-tuples (x 0 , . . . , x s ) satisfying (9). For any 1 i n, we have
Let us label the columns of M from 0 to s. Let P ⊆ {0, . . . , s} be the set of indices of columns which are pivots for M and P c its complementary. We denote by a the smallest element of P c . Notice that |P c | = t and a s + 1 − t.
In (10), we can eliminate any x j,i where j ∈ P using (11) . By this manner we get an expression depending only on the x j,i 's for j ∈ P c . If we fix the value of the x r,i 's for any r ∈ P c \ {a}, we obtain an equation of the form Q(x a,i ) = 0,
where Q is a q-polynomial of q-degree at most a. From Proposition 1, there are at most q a possible values for x a,i for any choice of the elements x r,i with r ∈ P c \ {i}. Using (12) we deduce that there are at most q m(t−1)+a q m(t−1)+s+1−t possible choices for the tuple (x 0,i , . . . , x s,i ). Consequently, Equation (9) has at most q mn(t−1)+n(s+1−t) solutions. Finally, since the full rank (s + 1 − t) × (s + 1) matrices in row echelon form are in one-to-one correspondence with t-dimensional subspaces of By assumption (in the statement of Proposition 2), we have s < k. Next, since n m, we see that the exponents in the above sum are all less than or equal 0. More precisely, To conclude the proof of Proposition 2, suppose that
min{n, k(s + 1)} − a.
This means that dim F q m ker Ψ max{0, k(s + 1) − n} + a.
Using Markov inequality together with Proposition 6, we get
This concludes the proof.
